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INTRODUCTION: WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, 
THE ORIGIN OF THE RULE OF REASON, 
AND THE ACTAVIS CHALLENGE 
William H. Rooney & Timothy G. Fleming* 
The origin of the Rule of Reason can be traced to the notable 
decision of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (1898), 
which was written by William Howard Taft during his tenure 
on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. There, Judge Taft 
distinguished between restraints that were mainly or entirely 
designed to restrain trade and those that are ancillary to a 
procompetitive main purpose. That fundamental distinction, 
drawn at the dawn of Sherman Act jurisprudence, forms the 
basis of the Rule of Reason that currently informs antitrust 
case law. 
This Article describes the context in which the Rule of 
Reason was debated and defended both in public discourse by 
President and Professor Taft and in the landmark Supreme 
Court decisions of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United 
States (1911) and United States v. American Tobacco Co. 
(1911). This Article then follows the development of the Rule of 
Reason through Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United 
States (1918) to the modern era of antitrust jurisprudence.  
 
* William H. Rooney is a partner of Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and 
the Co-Chair of the firm’s U.S. Antitrust Practice. Timothy G. Fleming is a 
second-year litigation associate at Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP. This 
Article represents the tentative thoughts of the authors and should not be 
construed as the position of any other person or entity, including Willkie 
Farr & Gallagher LLP or any of its clients. This Article is provided for news 
and informational purposes only and does not take into account the 
qualifications, exceptions, and other considerations that may be relevant to 
particular situations. Nothing contained herein constitutes, or is to be 
considered, the rendering of legal advice, generally or as to a specific matter, 
or a warranty of any kind. Readers are responsible for obtaining legal advice 
from their own legal counsel. The authors disclaim liability for any errors 
in, or any reliance upon, this information. 
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Finally, this Article describes the application of the Rule of 
Reason to reverse-payment settlements in the pharmaceutical 
sector, one of the most challenging contemporary antitrust 
issues. It does so through a discussion of the Supreme Court 
case FTC v. Actavis (2013) and the Third Circuit’s application 
of Actavis in In re Wellbutrin Xl Antitrust Litig. Indirect 
Purchaser Class (2017).   
 This Article provided the foundation for, and 
introduction to, the remarks of Professor Michael A. Carrier 
and Mr. Saul Morgenstern that were delivered at the New York 
State Bar Association Antitrust Law Section’s William 
Howard Taft Lecture on September 28, 2017.  Those remarks 
are reprinted in article form in this volume of the Columbia 
Business Law Review. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
William Howard Taft is perhaps best known for being the 
only person to serve both as President of the United States 
and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Some associate him 
with antitrust law as an enforcer. Indeed, his administration 
prosecuted twice as many antitrust cases as that of Theodore 
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Roosevelt.1 Several seminal antitrust cases, which will be 
discussed below, were decided during his Presidency.  
Less known among the general population is the role that 
Taft played in the early history of the Sherman Antitrust Act 
and the formation of the Rule of Reason. Before his election to 
the Presidency and his later ascent to the Supreme Court, 
Judge Taft of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a 
framework for antitrust cases that continues to inform the 
structure of the Rule of Reason today.   
In Taft’s era, key questions surrounding the Sherman Act 
revolved around its constitutionality, its relationship to the 
common law jurisprudence on restraints of trade, and the 
extent to which the Act would constrain business conduct.2 
Today, a major issue confronting courts and commentators is 
the interplay of the Sherman Act, its Rule of Reason, and the 
Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme governing brand-name 
and generic drugs. The extent to which the Sherman Act 
should constrain business conduct—here in the 
pharmaceutical industry—still predominates the debate 
within antitrust and business circles and centers upon the 
proper understanding and application of the Rule of Reason. 
II. TAFT AND THE RULE OF REASON 
In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert H. Bork opined that, 
“given the time at which it was written, [Taft’s opinion in 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel] must rank as one of 
the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust opinions in the 
history of the law.”3 He described Addyston Pipe as an opinion 
“of almost unparalleled suggestiveness,” albeit one whose 
“potentialities . . . remain almost entirely unexploited.”4 While 
 
1 William Howard Taft, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA [hereinafter Taft 
Encyclopedia Entry], https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-
Howard-Taft (last updated Jan. 25, 2018). 
2 See e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 
(1897); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).  
3 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 26 (2nd ed. 1993) 
[hereinafter ANTITRUST PARADOX].  
4 Id.  
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the case had several facets, including a question of “whether 
the trade restrained by the combination of the defendants was 
interstate trade,”5 Taft’s discussion of the reasonableness of 
restraints of trade causes the opinion, issued near the turn of 
the twentieth century, to remain relevant, and indeed 
prescient, today.  
Addyston Pipe involved “manufacturers and vendors of 
cast-iron pipe” that “entered into a combination to raise the 
prices for pipe for all the states west and south of New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia.”6 The defendants argued that the 
Sherman Act “was not intended to reach any agreements that 
were not void and unenforceable at common law” and that 
defendants’ agreement would not violate the common law and 
was therefore beyond antitrust scrutiny.7  
As Taft noted in Addyston Pipe, however, a then-recent 
Supreme Court case, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight 
Ass’n, “held that contracts in restraint of interstate 
transportation were within the statute, whether the 
restraints would be regarded as reasonable at common law or 
not.”8 Trans-Missouri specified that the Sherman Antitrust 
Act “render[ed] illegal all agreements which are in restraint 
of trade or commerce.”9 Bork styles Justice Peckham’s opinion 
in Trans-Missouri as a rejection of the “reasonable-price 
standard” utilized by the lower court and incorporated into 
Justice White’s Trans-Missouri dissent.10 As Bork 
summarizes, “[s]ince the restriction in this case operated upon 
prices, this test proposed to judge the ‘reasonableness’ of the 
prices set by cartel agreement.”11 
 
5 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 294 (6th Cir. 
1898), aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899).  
6 Id. at 291.  
7 Id. at 278.  
8 Id.  
9 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 341 
(1897).  
10 ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 3, at 22–23.  
11 Id. at 22.  
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The Addyston Pipe defendants sought to distinguish 
Trans-Missouri by arguing that “a less stringent rule of 
construction applies to contracts restricting parties in sales of 
merchandise, which is purely a private business,” than the 
rule applied in Trans-Missouri, which involved “a quasi public 
employment necessarily under public control.”12 Taft 
sidestepped the question of “[w]hether or not there is 
substance in such a distinction” and argued that the 
agreement at issue in Trans-Missouri would have been 
prohibited under the common law.13 
Taft reviewed cases from the United States at the federal 
and state level, and from the United Kingdom and Canada, to 
distill a rule that: 
[N]o conventional restraint of trade can be enforced 
unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary 
to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and 
necessary to protect the covenantee in the full 
enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to 
protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of those 
fruits by the other party.14  
Taft styled this rule as one dictated by the common law. 
Bork, however, notes that Taft “chose his common law cases 
carefully . . . and imposed upon them his own ideas. What 
emerged was not the restatement it pretended to be so much 
as a new structure.”15 That structure would distinguish 
between “ancillary” restraints and ones that were designed 
solely to restrain competition. The former were permissible 
while the latter were prohibited. 
Judge Taft directly addressed the “reasonable-price” 
approach proposed by Justice White in the dissent in Trans-
Missouri and delivered a stinging rebuke. Courts that used 
that standard, Taft wrote, had “set sail on a sea of doubt, and 
have assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts which 
 
12 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 278.  
13 Id. at 278–79, 291. 
14 Id. at 282.  
15 ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 3, at 27. 
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have no other purpose . . . than the mutual restraint of the 
parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public 
interest, and how much is not.”16 He added that the “manifest 
danger in the administration of justice according to so 
shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard would seem to 
be a strong reason against adopting it.”17  
By contrast, Taft’s “doctrine of naked and ancillary 
restraints,” according to Bork, “offered the Sherman Act a 
sophisticated rule of reason, a method of preserving socially 
valuable transactions by defining the scope of an exception for 
efficiency-creating agreements within an otherwise inflexible 
per se rule.”18 
While Taft would soon leave the Sixth Circuit, he would 
again opine on the Sherman Act, though then as President of 
the United States and later as Professor of Law at Yale Law 
School. 
III. TAFT ON ANTITRUST AFTER STANDARD OIL 
AND AMERICAN TOBACCO 
During Taft’s presidency, the Supreme Court decided two 
of the most important cases in Sherman Act jurisprudence, 
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,19 and United 
States v. American Tobacco.20 The Standard Oil Court 
examined the agglomeration that had become the company by 
that name under both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 
though without articulating different criteria for judgment 
under each.21 The Standard Oil Court declared “that the 
criteria [under the Sherman Act] to be resorted to in any given 
case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the 
section have been committed is the rule of reason guided by 
 
16 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 283–84.  
17 Id. at 284.  
18 ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 3, at 30. 
19 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
20 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
21 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 72–74.  
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the established law and by the plain duty to enforce the 
prohibitions of the act.”22  
The government had proposed that “the language of the 
statute embraces every contract, combination, etc., in 
restraint of trade, and hence its text leaves no room for the 
exercise of judgment, but simply imposes the plain duty of 
applying its prohibitions to every case within its literal 
language.”23 The Court rejected that proposed rule, and held: 
The merely generic enumeration which the statute 
makes of the acts to which it refers, and the absence 
of any definition of restraint of trade as used in the 
statute, leaves room for but one conclusion, which is, 
that it was expressly designed not to unduly limit the 
application of the act by precise definition, but, while 
clearly fixing a standard, that is, by defining the 
ulterior boundaries which could not be transgressed 
with impunity, to leave it to be determined by the light 
of reason, guided by the principles of law and the duty 
to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the 
statute, in every given case whether any particular act 
or contract was within the contemplation of the 
statute.24 
Later in the opinion, the Court invoked the term that has 
assumed center stage in contemporary antitrust 
jurisprudence: 
[T]he construction which we have deduced from the 
history of the act and the analysis of its text is simply 
that in every case where it is claimed that an act or 
acts are in violation of the statute, the rule of reason, 
in the light of the principles of law and the public 
policy which the act embodies, must be applied.25  
A few weeks after the Standard Oil decision, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in United States v. American Tobacco, 
 
22 Id. at 62 (emphasis added).  
23 Id. at 63. 
24 Id. at 63–64 (emphasis added).  
25 Id. at 66 (emphasis added).  
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which also dealt with Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and 
concerned alleged anticompetitive conduct in the tobacco 
industry.26 The opinion offered additional gloss on the 
Standard Oil ruling and again invoked the nomenclature with 
which we are familiar today:  
Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the 
statute, it was held in the Standard Oil Case that, as 
the words ‘restraint of trade’ at common law and in 
the law of this country at the time of the adoption of 
the anti-trust act only embraced acts or contracts or 
agreements or combinations which operated to the 
prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting 
competition, or unduly obstructing the due course of 
trade, or which, either because of their inherent 
nature or effect, or because of the evident purpose of 
the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the 
words as used in the statute were designed to have 
and did have but a like significance.27 
The American Tobacco Court found that the record before 
it demonstrated the soundness of the Standard Oil Court’s 
adoption of the “rule of reason” and therefore 
“unequivocal[ly]” “re-express[ed] and reaffirm[ed]” that rule:  
[T]he plain demonstration which this record gives . . . 
serves to strengthen our conviction as to the 
correctness of the rule of construction—the rule of 
reason—which was applied in the Standard Oil Case, 
the application of which rule to the statute we now, in 
the most unequivocal terms, re-express and 
reaffirm.28 
The Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions were of 
such importance to Taft that they were the first topics he 
discussed in his 1911 State of the Union remarks.29 According 
 
26 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 142 (1911).  
27 Id. at 179. 
28 Id. at 180. 
29 At the time, the State of the Union was not a live address, but rather 
consisted of written remarks that the President sent to Congress.  
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to Taft, the “epoch-making” decisions “serve[d] to advise the 
business world authoritatively of the scope and operation of 
the anti-trust act of 1890.”30 Taft mentioned prior Supreme 
Court opinions where “the court said that the statute should 
be given a reasonable construction and refused to include 
within its inhibition, certain contractual restraints of trade 
which it denominated as incidental or as indirect.”31  
Although Taft did not cite specific cases, and while he 
connected his reasoning to earlier “Supreme Court opinions,” 
the rule he described primarily echoed the rule that Taft 
himself had formulated in Addyston Pipe. Standard Oil and 
American Tobacco, he argued, “adopted the tests of the 
common law, and in defining exceptions to the literal 
application of the statute, only substituted for the test of being 
incidental or indirect, that of being reasonable, and this, 
without varying in the slightest the actual scope and effect of 
the statute.”32  
Taft defended the recent decisions against two lines of 
criticism: (1) that the opinions had limited the scope of the 
statute and “emasculated it,” and (2) that the cases 
“committed to the court the undefined and unlimited 
discretion to determine whether a case of restraint of trade is 
within the terms of the statute.”33 Against the former line of 
criticism, Taft insisted that, through the Supreme Court’s 
“judgment[,] every contract and combination in restraint of 
interstate trade made with the purpose or necessary effect of 
controlling prices by stifling competition, or of establishing in 
whole or in part a monopoly of such trade, is condemned by 
the statute.”34 Taft asserted that “[t]he most extreme critics 
can not instance a case that ought to be condemned under the 
 
30 President William Howard Taft, Third Annual Message to Congress 
(Dec. 5, 1911) in AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Gerhard Peters & John T. 
Woolley eds., 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? 
pid=29552 [perma.cc/ZK4K-EHB6].  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Id.  
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statute which is not brought within its terms as thus 
construed.”35  
Against the argument that the Rule of Reason left courts 
with “undefined and unlimited discretion,” Taft insisted that: 
A reasonable restraint of trade at common law is well 
understood and is clearly defined. It does not rest in 
the discretion of the court. It must be limited to 
accomplish the purpose of a lawful main contract to 
which, in order that it shall be enforceable at all, it 
must be incidental. If it exceeds the needs of that 
contract, it is void.36 
In his 1911 State of the Union address, therefore, Taft 
essentially equated the test formulated by the Supreme Court 
to the one he developed over a decade prior in the Sixth 
Circuit’s Addyston Pipe decision. In Taft’s view, the Rule of 
Reason did not introduce uncertainty into antitrust law. 
Rather, it provided a principle by which contracts were to be 
judged. Taft acknowledged that certain additional legislation 
delineating specific violations may be useful. Still, he 
remained steadfast that “the discussions which have been 
brought out in recent days . . . have produced nothing but 
glittering generalities and have offered no line of distinction 
or rule of action as definite and as clear as that which the 
Supreme Court itself lays down in enforcing the statute.”37 
After concluding his term as President and before 
assuming his seat on the Supreme Court, Taft served as 
Professor of Law at Yale Law School, where he continued to 
contribute to the subject of antitrust law through his 
scholarship (Bork was similarly a professor at Yale when he 
published The Antitrust Paradox). Taft authored a book 
entitled The Anti-trust Act and the Supreme Court to address 
the ongoing discussion of an amendment to the Sherman 
 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
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Act.38 Taft feared that “[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court 
interpreting the statute have not been clearly understood by 
many of those who have taken part in that discussion.”39  
After providing a history of crucial opinions interpreting 
the Sherman Act, Taft recalled his challenge to opponents of 
the Standard Oil and American Tobacco opinions, stating that 
he “invited the gentlemen who were most stentorian in 
condemnation of the interpretation given to the statute by the 
Supreme Court to mention and describe a case in which they 
would have the statute apply to which it would not apply 
under the reasoning of the court.”40 According to Taft, his 
challenge was never answered.41  
Taft also challenged the other criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s antitrust opinions—that “business men [could not] 
live under the anti-trust law because nobody can tell what it 
means.”42 Taft countered with a ringing endorsement of the 
Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence, which he declared 
to be “a valuable asset for the public.”43 According to Taft:  
No man who reads this series of decisions need be 
doubtful whether, when he is making a business 
arrangement, he is violating the law or not. He can 
search his own heart and he can tell what his purpose 
is and what the effect of his act is going to be.44 
Taft’s opinion in Addyston, his post-Addyston thoughts and 
writings, and the debate to which they were addressed 
foreshadow the full range of contemporary Rule of Reason 
commentary and jurisprudence. Following Taft’s example, 
courts examine the pertinent agreement, determine whether 
the challenged restraint was incidental to the legitimate 
 
38 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME 
COURT (1914).  
39 Id. at 1.  
40 Id. at 94–95.  
41 Id. at 95.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 96. 
44 Id. (emphasis added).  
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purpose of the agreement, and determine whether the 
restraint was reasonably necessary to accomplish that 
purpose.45 Assessing the actual effect of the agreement and 
the challenged restraint on competition would come at the 
next stage of the development of the Rule of Reason. 
Although the Rule of Reason has evolved since Taft’s day, 
especially with respect to an emphasis on assessing effects, 
one can argue that the fundamental conceptual structure of 
the Rule of Reason remains as outlined by Judge Taft in 
Addyston Pipe and adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Standard Oil and American Tobacco.  
IV. THE RULE OF REASON AND A NEW EMPHASIS 
ON EFFECT 
The next significant articulation of the Rule of Reason 
occurred in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States 
(“Chicago Board of Trade”) under the authorship of Justice 
Brandeis.46 The decision held that “[t]he true test of legality 
is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates 
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is 
such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”47 
Applying that test, according to Justice Brandeis, requires 
consideration of “the facts peculiar to the business to which 
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its 
effect, actual or probable.”48  
In Chicago Board of Trade, members of Chicago’s Board of 
Trade were prohibited from purchasing “wheat, corn, oats or 
rye” above a price set at the end of “the ‘call,’” a special session 
of the Board.49 Examining the effects of the rule, the Court 
found that: 
 
45 See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 145–47 (3d Cir. 2001). 
46 Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
47 Id. at 238. 
48 Id. (emphasis added).  
49 Id. at 236–37.  
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As it applies to only a small part of the grain shipped 
to Chicago and to that only during a part of the 
business day and does not apply at all to grain shipped 
to other markets, the rule had no appreciable effect on 
general market prices; nor did it materially affect the 
total volume of grain coming to Chicago. But within 
the narrow limits of its operation the rule helped to 
improve market conditions.50 
The Chicago Board of Trade Court reached its conclusion, 
therefore, based primarily on a finding regarding the 
competitive effect of the restraint. The Court’s emphasis thus 
progressed from assessing only (or primarily) the relationship 
between the restraint and the productive component of the 
agreement to the additional element of the actual impact of 
the agreement on competitive conditions in the marketplace. 
The doctrine of ancillary restraints remained a necessary 
condition for the application of the Rule of Reason (and, if the 
restraint were not ancillary, it would likely be condemned 
under the per se rule). But the Court, consistent with the 
Progressive Era’s focus on empirical analysis, undertook to 
assess the actual impact of the agreement on competitive 
conditions in the market. The implicit basis of comparison was 
the market without the agreement or restraint—i.e., “the 
condition before and after the restraint was imposed.”51 
In the decades following Chicago Board of Trade, the Rule 
of Reason declined in fashion. According to Professor Thomas 
C. Arthur of Emory Law School, “[u]ntil the late 1970s, the 
rule of reason had been almost completely replaced by a 
comprehensive network of per se rules.”52 However, beginning 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, “the [Supreme] Court 
transformed antitrust by restricting the reach of the per se 
rules and expanding the scope of the rule of reason.”53 All the 
 
50 Id. at 240 (emphasis added). 
51 Id. at 238. 
52 Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of Reason: A Less Ambitious 
Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337, 337 (2000).  
53 Id.  
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while, however, the Court’s focus development of the Rule of 
Reason has focused squarely on effect. 
The Court has also recognized that the structure and 
application of the Rule of Reason must be flexible and “meet 
for the case,” in some instances “quick,” in others “sedulous,”54 
but in all cases fixed on effect:  
[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn 
between restraints that give rise to an intuitively 
obvious inference of anticompetitive effect and those 
that call for more detailed treatment. What is 
required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, 
looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a 
restraint. The object is to see whether the experience 
of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, 
that a confident conclusion about the principal 
tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at 
least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.55 
The “principal tendency” in question is the effect of the 
agreement—whether “the arrangements in question would 
have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”56 In 
the same case, the Court held that, before the burden is 
shifted to the defendant “to show empirical evidence of 
procompetitive effects,” a court must identify “the theoretical 
basis for the anticompetitive effects and consider[] whether 
the effects actually are anticompetitive.”57 And the Court has 
acknowledged that short-form Rule of Reason analyses can be 
used to acquit challenged restraints as well as to condemn 
them.58  
 
54 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780–81 (1999).  
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 770 (emphasis added). 
57 Id. at 775 n.12.  
58 See, e.g., Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 
(2010) (suggesting that agreements that “are essential if the product is to 
be available at all” are “likely to survive the Rule of Reason”) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted); see also id. (further noting that “the Rule 
of Reason . . . can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye”) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted); Vogel v. Am. Soc’y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 
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The most recent challenge in applying the Rule of Reason 
was issued by the Supreme Court in 2014 in the 
pharmaceutical context. In FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme 
Court invoked the Rule of Reason to assess “reverse payment” 
settlements that resolve bona-fide patent-infringement 
litigation under the Hatch-Waxman statutory framework.59 
V. THE ACTAVIS CHALLENGE: ADAPTING THE 
RULE OF REASON TO THE SETTLEMENT 
CONTEXT 
The progeny of FTC v. Actavis, which is still well under 
development, has attempted to adapt the Rule of Reason, at 
the direction of the Supreme Court, to restraints contained in 
the settlement of genuine patent disputes as to which both 
sides, by assumption, had an objectively “realistic[] 
expect[ation of] success on the merits.”60 The restraint 
typically relates to the date on which the settlement 
agreement provides for the issuance of a license by the patent 
holder to the generic manufacturer for entry into the relevant 
market. The date of entry is usually within the life of the 
patent but later than the date of the settlement. The claim is 
typically that the date of entry was delayed in return for some 
form of compensation (the “reverse payment”) transmitted by 
the patent holder to the putative generic entrant. 
The underlying patent litigation occurs under the Hatch-
Waxman statute. Generic drug manufacturers hoping to 
compete with a brand-name drug can submit an “Abbreviated 
New Drug Application [‘ANDA’] specifying that the generic 
 
598, 603 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Moreover, there is no evidence that the Society 
has any power in the market for appraising gems, or any other market, and 
an absence of market power is a reason against inferring that a business 
practice is monopolistic.”); compare Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 780–81, with 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 109 n.39 (1984) (“[T]he rule of reason can sometimes be applied in the 
twinkling of an eye.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
59 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
60 See Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 
508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993). 
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has the same active ingredients as, and is biologically 
equivalent to, the already-approved brand-name drug.”61  
Such generics can avoid the costly studies and long waits 
for approval that new drugs undergo. The purpose of this 
process is procompetitive, as it allows the generic to “piggy-
back on the pioneer’s approval efforts,” which “speed[s] the 
introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market.”62 The 
statute provides an incentive for the first generic to file an 
ANDA; from its “first commercial marketing of its drug,” it 
will have a 180-day exclusivity period where no other generic 
can market its version, and its only competition is the brand-
name drug or its authorized generic.63  
To gain approval, the generic must “assure the FDA that 
the generic will not infringe the brand-name’s patents.”64 Per 
the statute, the generic can do so in four ways: 
It can certify that the brand-name manufacturer has 
not listed any relevant patents. It can certify that any 
relevant patents have expired. It can request approval 
to market beginning when any still-in-force patents 
expire. Or, it can certify that any listed, relevant 
patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug described in the 
Abbreviated New Drug Application . . . . Taking this 
last-mentioned route (called the “paragraph IV” 
route), automatically counts as patent infringement 
. . . and often means provoking litigation.65 
FTC v. Acatvis stemmed from the conclusion of one such 
litigation. Solvay Pharmaceuticals held a patent to a drug 
known as AndroGel.66 A number of generics either filed 
ANDAs or joined in litigation with a generic filer.67 At the 
conclusion of the litigation, the party that filed the first 
 
61 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
62 Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).  
63 Id. at 2228–29. 
64 Id. at 2228 (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
65 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
66 Id. at 2229. 
67 Id.  
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ANDA, Actavis, Inc., agreed to delay marketing its generic 
until August 31, 2015, more than five years before the patent’s 
expiration, and it agreed “to promote AndroGel to 
urologists.”68 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he other 
generic manufacturers made roughly similar promises.”69  
Solvay, for its part, “agreed to pay millions of dollars to 
each generic.”70 Actavis, for example, was to receive “an 
estimated $19–30 million annually, for nine years.”71 The 
settling parties described the payments as “compensation for 
other services the generics promised to perform, but the FTC 
contend[ed] the other services had little value.”72 However, 
“[a]ccording to the FTC[,] the true point of the payments was 
to compensate the generics for agreeing not to compete 
against AndroGel until 2015.”73 
In Actavis, the FTC appealed from a defeat in the Eleventh 
Circuit.74 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, while paying a 
competitor not to enter a market is generally an antitrust 
violation, “‘reverse payment settlements of patent litigation 
presen[t] atypical cases because one of the parties owns a 
patent,’” and patents allow the holder to exclude competitors 
from the market.75 The Eleventh Circuit applied what could 
be viewed as a quick-look analysis to acquit the agreement: 
“‘[A]bsent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a 
reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack 
so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of 
the exclusionary potential of the patent.’”76 Under PRE, 
“litigation cannot be . . . sham unless the litigation is 
 
68 Id.  
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 2230.  
75 Id. (citing FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1307, 1310 
(11th Cir. 2012)).  
76 Id. (citing Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312).  
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objectively baseless[,]” which occurs only if “no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”77  
While the Eleventh Circuit “recognized that, if the parties 
to this sort of case do not settle, a court might declare the 
patent invalid,” it held that “in light of the public policy 
favoring settlement of disputes (among other 
considerations)[,] . . . the courts could not require the parties 
to continue to litigate in order to avoid antitrust liability.”78 
The Eleventh Circuit opinion provided an example of the 
“scope of the patent” rule that was the majority position 
among circuit courts before Actavis.79 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision authored by Justice 
Breyer,80 reversed the Eleventh Circuit. The Court noted that, 
while a valid patent permits the holder to exclude others from 
the market and to charge higher prices than those found in a 
competitive market, an “invalidated patent carries with it no 
such right. And even a valid patent confers no right to exclude 
products or processes that do not actually infringe.”81  
The Court pointed out that “[t]he paragraph IV litigation 
in this case put the patent’s validity at issue, as well as its 
actual preclusive scope. The parties’ settlement ended that 
litigation.”82 Justice Breyer concluded that settlements of the 
type at issue, where “the plaintiff agreed to pay the 
defendants many millions of dollars to stay out of its market, 
even though the defendants did not have any claim that the 
plaintiff was liable to them for damages . . . tend to have 
significant adverse effects on competition.”83 
 
77 Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49, 51, 60 (1993). 
78 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2225, 2230.  
79 See Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on 
Reverse Payments: Why Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on 
Reverse-Payment Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA 
L. REV. 57, 66–76 (2010).  
80 Justice Alito did not participate in the decision. See Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2223. 
81 Id. at 2231 (emphasis in original).  
82 Id. 
83 Id.  
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The Court acknowledged that, on some occasions, the 
reverse payment could be justified by “traditional settlement 
considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair value 
for services . . . In such cases, the parties may have provided 
for a reverse payment without having sought or brought about 
the anticompetitive consequences . . . mentioned above.”84 
However, the Court found that this concern did not “justify 
dismissing the FTC’s complaint,” since “[a]n antitrust 
defendant may show in the antitrust proceeding that 
legitimate justifications are present, thereby explaining the 
presence of the challenged term and showing the lawfulness 
of that term under the rule of reason.”85 
The Court also found that “it is normally not necessary to 
litigate patent validity to answer the antitrust question.”86 
The Court stated: 
An unexplained large reverse payment itself would 
normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts 
about the patent's survival. And that fact, in turn, 
suggests that the payment's objective is to maintain 
supracompetitive prices to be shared among the 
patentee and the challenger rather than face what 
might have been a competitive market—the very 
anticompetitive consequence that underlies the claim 
of antitrust unlawfulness.87 
Justice Breyer’s opinion acknowledged that “[t]he owner of 
a particularly valuable patent might contend, of course, that 
even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment.”88 The 
Court, however, continued: “[B]e that as it may, the payment 
(if otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of 
competition. And, as we have said, that consequence 
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.”89 Justice 
 
84 Id. at 2236.  
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. (emphasis added); see also King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. 
Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403–04 (3d Cir. 2015) 
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Breyer concluded that “the size of the unexplained reverse 
payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent's 
weakness.”90  
Some have argued that the Court was suggesting a 
procedural mechanism by which a court should infer an 
anticompetitive effect from an “unexplained large reverse 
payment” from the brand name to the generic.91 That 
suggestion, however, would seem to contradict the Court’s 
decision to decline the FTC’s invitation to adopt presumptions 
of illegality or to subject reverse payment agreements to 
“quick look” condemnation. Instead, the Court required the 
application of the full Rule of Reason scrutiny,92 stating: 
[T]he likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about 
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale 
in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation 
costs, its independence from other services for which 
it might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing justification. The existence and degree of 
any anticompetitive consequence may also vary as 
among industries. These complexities lead us to 
conclude that the FTC must prove its case as in other 
rule-of-reason cases.93 
The Court then enlisted the lower courts to: 
[S]tructure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on the 
one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated 
 
(characterizing Actavis as holding that “reverse payments are problematic 
because of their potential to negatively impact consumer welfare by 
preventing the risk of competition, which arises from expected litigation 
outcomes”).  
90 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236–37. In King Drug, the Third Circuit 
extended this reasoning to cases where the generic receives some type of 
consideration other than a monetary payment, such as the brand-name 
agreeing to delay its own “authorized generic” of the drug. 791 F.3d at 393, 
403.  
91 Brief for 58 Law, Economics, and Business Professors as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 6–7, In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 
No. 15-2875 (3d Cir. Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Wellbutrin Amicus Brief].  
92 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237.  
93 Id. 
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to permit proper analysis, and, on the other, 
consideration of every possible fact or theory 
irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the 
basic question—that of the presence of significant 
unjustified anticompetitive consequences.94 
The Court thus seemed to limit its decision to holding that 
the FTC’s pleading against Actavis (and similar such 
pleadings) was legally sufficient and was to be assessed under 
the full Rule of Reason. Although, as noted above, the Court 
suggested that “litigating patent validity” should be “normally 
not necessary,”95 the Court expressly “[left] to the lower courts 
the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust 
litigation,”96 and, with it, the competitive assessment of the 
reverse payment settlement.  
VI. WELLBUTRIN AND ASSESSING 
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES 
Just how that competitive assessment should be 
structured continues to be a controversial topic. In the recent 
Wellbutrin decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
court held that “[a]ppellants must show that the harm they 
say they experienced—increased drug prices for Wellbutrin 
XL (and its generic equivalents)—was caused by the 
settlement they are complaining about.”97 The Third Circuit 
reviewed appellants’ showing of harm in the context of an 
assessment of appellants’ antitrust standing, rather than in 
the context of an application of the Rule of Reason.98 Given 
that the appellants were direct and indirect purchasers, 
 
94 Id. at 2238. 
95 Id. at 2236. 
96 Id. at 2238. 
97 In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class, 868 
F.3d 132, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2017).  
98 Id. at 163–170, 170 n.64 (“Having concluded that the Appellants lack 
antitrust standing, we do not need to consider the District Court’s 
application of the rule of reason. We note, however, that the rule of reason 
inquiry is fact intensive and is not easy to resolve at the summary judgment 
stage.”).  
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however, the question arises as to whether appellants’ failure 
to demonstrate antitrust injury is equivalent to their failure 
to demonstrate consumer injury, or a cognizable 
anticompetitive effect—i.e., an injury to competition—under 
the Rule of Reason.  
In attempting to establish an antitrust injury, appellants 
purported to show that, absent the settlement, the generic 
company would have launched its drug earlier.99 As the Third 
Circuit found, however, to make that argument, the 
appellants would have also had to show that the generic 
launch would have been legal and not been blocked by a 
patent.100 
After rejecting an argument that the generic might have 
been able to license the patent,101 the Third Circuit turned to 
the question of whether the generic could have prevailed in 
the underlying patent litigation. It held that the size of the 
reverse payment itself was “far from dispositive” of the 
outcome of the underlying litigation.102 The Third Circuit 
found that the size of the payment was especially limited in 
serving as a proxy for “how confident a litigant is in the 
strength of its case” in instances, like the case it was 
considering, where “the settlement is complex and multi-
faceted” and the patent holder is risk-averse.103 The court also 
examined the merits of the litigants’ positions in the 
underlying patent suit and concluded that “no reasonable jury 
could conclude that the [potential infringer] would have been 
more likely than not to prevail.”104 
Appellants sought rehearing or rehearing en banc. A group 
of fifty-eight professors, led by Distinguished Professor of Law 
Michael A. Carrier, submitted an amicus brief in support of 
the petition. The brief argued, in part, that, by placing too 
little weight on the size of the reverse payment and by 
 
99 Id. at 165. 
100 Id. 
101 See id. at 166–67.  
102 Id. at 168.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 169. 
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apparently making an exception for “complex and multi-
faceted settlements,” the Third Circuit panel disregarded the 
instructions of the Supreme Court in Actavis as well as 
precedent from within the Third Circuit.105 The professors 
further argued that the Actavis Court specified that “a large 
unexplained payment can serve as a proxy for a patent’s 
weakness” and that the Third Circuit erred in looking beyond 
that payment to examine the strength of the underlying 
litigation positions.106 The Third Circuit denied Appellants’ 
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. 
Wellbutrin, as part of the progeny of Actavis, is just one 
among numerous lower courts trying to adapt the Rule of 
Reason, without indulging presumptions of illegality, to 
assess the competitive consequences of reverse payment 
settlements. Just how courts should compare output and price 
in the relevant market with the settlement agreement to those 
in the relevant market without the settlement agreement, 
without invoking the legal presumptions that Actavis 
explicitly rejected, remains to be clarified.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
Without using the term “Rule of Reason,” Judge William 
Howard Taft’s opinion in the Sixth Circuit case of United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. has served as the 
foundation for the primary mode of Sherman Act analysis. 
Taft believed that the doctrine of naked and ancillary 
restraints of trade would provide clarity and certainty to 
business actors. Taft endorsed the Rule of Reason that was 
further developed in Standard Oil and American Tobacco, 
claiming first as President and then as a Professor of Law that 
the rule provided the clarity and certainty that he prized.  
Since the twilight of the Progressive Era, the Rule of 
Reason has focused on both the relationship between the 
restraint and the procompetitive aspect of the agreement of 
which it is a part and the competitive effects of the restraint. 
 
105 See Wellbutrin Amicus Brief, supra note 91, at 1–11.   
106 Id. at 7.  
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Courts have also adopted variations on the Rule of Reason 
that are “meet for the case,” though they have maintained 
their sights on the relationship between the restraint and both 
the procompetitive purpose of the agreement and the 
economic impact of the restraint and the agreement. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in FTC v. Actavis raised a 
new issue in Rule of Reason jurisprudence. The Court rejected 
what had become the majority approach to reverse payment 
settlements among the circuits, which evaluated the restraint 
in light of the patent’s scope, in favor of a full-scale Rule of 
Reason review. The primary challenge has been assessing the 
competitive effect of settlement agreements that resolve bona-
fide litigation, include “reverse” consideration, and permit 
generic entry before the expiration of the patent in dispute. 
A recent Third Circuit opinion, and a subsequent petition 
for rehearing, squarely presented the question of how that 
competitive assessment should be undertaken: In considering 
the counterfactual (the relevant market without the subject 
agreement), should courts view a large reverse payment as 
dispositive, or at least presumptive, evidence of an outcome of 
the underlying patent litigation in favor of the generic 
entrant? Or should courts consider such explanations of the 
payment as risk aversion by the patent holder to a small but 
still plausible possibility of loss in the underlying patent 
litigation as sufficient to justify the payment as a legitimate 
means of resolving that litigation?  
Those and similar questions may remain unresolved until 
the Supreme Court decides another reverse payment case. 
